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The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver.
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Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion. In Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing . ACM, Cambridge MA USA, 412–425
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Algorithmic information structure design: a survey
Shaddin Dughmi. 2017 · 2017
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Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica. 2017 · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation . ACM, Ithaca NY USA, 523–538
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Information Design: A Unified Perspective
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Strategizing against No-regret Learners. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems , H. Wallach, H. Larochelle, A. Beygelzimer, F. d’ Alché-Buc, E. Fox, and R. Garnett (Eds.), Vol. 32. Curran Associates, Inc
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation . ACM, Budapest Hungary, 927–928
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Geoffroy de Clippel and Xu Zhang. 2022 · 2022
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Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan. 2022 · 2022
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Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan. 2019 · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Bayesian persuasion and information design
Emir Kamenica. 2019 · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Information Design
Ina Taneva. 2019 · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior. In 2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) . IEEE, Durham, NC, USA, 259–270
Modibo K. Camara, Jason D. Hartline, and Aleck Johnsen. 2020 · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Online Bayesian Persuasion. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems , Vol. 33. Curran Associates, Inc., 16188–16198
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti. 2020 · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: Robust (bayesian) persuasion
Piotr Dworczak and Alessandro Pavan. 2020 · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Adversarial bilateral information design
Gabriel Ziegler. 2020 · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation . ACM, Boulder CO USA, 471–472
Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael I. Jordan, and Haifeng Xu. 2022 · 2022
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Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer, and David Lingenbrink. 2023 · 2023
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Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers
Linda Cai, S Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, and Shirley Zhang. 2023 · 2023
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Rationality-robust information design: Bayesian persuasion under quantal response. In Proceedings of the 2024 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) . SIAM, 501–546
Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, and Wei Tang. 2024 · 2024
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Contracting with a Learning Agent
Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Joshua R. Wang, and S. Matthew Weinberg. 2024 · 2024
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Tao Lin and Yiling Chen. 2024 · 2024
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Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein and Junyao Zhao. 2024 · 2024
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Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best Response
Kunhe Yang and Hanrui Zhang. 2024 · 2024
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