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We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving the signal.
On sparse approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations
Ingo Althöfer · 1994
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Repeated games with incomplete information
Robert J Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard E Stearns · 1995
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Playing large games using simple strategies
Richard J Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, and Aranyak Mehta · 2003
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Algorithm design
Jon Kleinberg and Eva Tardos · 2006
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Information structures in optimal auctions
Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer · 2007
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Influence through ignorance
Isabelle Brocas and Juan D Carrillo · 2007
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Bayesian persuasion
Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow · 2011
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Bayesian persuasion with multiple receivers
Yun Wang · 2013
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On the hardness of signaling
Shaddin Dughmi · 2014
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Implementing the “wisdom of the crowd”
Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour, and Motty Perry · 2014
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The limits of price discrimination
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris · 2015
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Expert advice to a voting body
Keith E Schnakenberg · 2015
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Persuading voters
Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara · 2016
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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris · 2016
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Hardness results for signaling in bayesian zero-sum and network routing games
Umang Bhaskar, Yu Cheng, Young Kun Ko, and Chaitanya Swamy · 2016
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Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion
Shaddin Dughmi and Haifeng Xu · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
A rothschild-stiglitz approach to bayesian persuasion
Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Algorithmic aspects of private Bayesian persuasion
Yakov Babichenko and Siddharth Barman · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Algorithmic information structure design: a survey
Shaddin Dughmi · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Arrangements
Dan Halperin and Micha Sharir · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Bayesian incentive-compatible bandit exploration
Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Vasilis Syrgkanis · 2020
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On the tractability of public persuasion with no externalities
Haifeng Xu · 2020
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Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver
Ju Hu and Xi Weng · 2021
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Learning to persuade on the fly: Robustness against ignorance
You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, and Haifeng Xu · 2021
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Regret-minimizing bayesian persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, and Konstantin Zabarnyi · 2022
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Non-bayesian persuasion
Geoffroy de Clippel and Xu Zhang · 2022
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Aviad Rubinstein · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
Arjada Bardhi and Yingni Guo · 2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Private Bayesian persuasion
Itai Arieli and Yakov Babichenko · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Information design: A unified perspective
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Bayesian persuasion and information design
Emir Kamenica · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Mechanisms for a no-regret agent: Beyond the common prior
Modibo K Camara, Jason D Hartline, and Aleck Johnsen · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Preparing for the worst but hoping for the best: Robust (bayesian) persuasion
Piotr Dworczak and Alessandro Pavan · 2022
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Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Svetlana Kosterina · 2022
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Strategizing against learners in Bayesian games
Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan · 2022
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Sequential information design: Markov persuasion process and its efficient reinforcement learning
Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael I Jordan, and Haifeng Xu · 2022
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Algorithmic information design in multi-player games: Possibilities and limits in singleton congestion
Chenghan Zhou, Thanh H Nguyen, and Haifeng Xu · 2022
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Persuading a behavioral agent: Approximately best responding and learning
Yiling Chen and Tao Lin · 2023
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Robust stackelberg equilibria
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, and Haifeng Xu · 2023
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Rationality-robust information design: Bayesian persuasion under quantal response
Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, and Wei Tang · 2024
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