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In classic principal-agent problems such as Stackelberg games, contract design, and Bayesian persuasion, the agent best responds to the principal's committed strategy.
Swap Regret and Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan · 1943
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Iterative Solution of Games by Fictitious Play
George W. Brown · 1951
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Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford and Joel Sobel · 1982
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Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems
Roger B Myerson · 1982
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Some perturbation theory for linear programming
James Renegar · 1994
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Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey · 1995
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Bounded rationality in individual decision making
Colin Camerer · 1998
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The theory of learning in games
Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine · 1998
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A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell · 2000
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The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem
Peter Auer, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E. Schapire · 2002
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Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies
Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmuel Zamir · 2004
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From External to Internal Regret
Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour · 2007
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Regret Bounds and Minimax Policies under Partial Monitoring
Jean-Yves Audibert and Sébastien Bubeck · 2010
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Contextual Multi-Armed Bandits
Tyler Lu, David Pal, and Martin Pal · 2010
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Bayesian Persuasion
Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow · 2011
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Combinatorial optimization: theory and algorithms
B. H. Korte and Jens Vygen · 2012
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Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Eva Tardos · 2015
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Lecture #17: No-Regret Dynamics
Tim Roughgarden · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer
Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, and Matt Weinberg · 2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Errors in probabilistic reasoning and judgment biases
Daniel J Benjamin · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Strategizing against No-regret Learners
Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
Modibo K. Camara, Jason D. Hartline, and Aleck Johnsen · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Online Bayesian Persuasion
Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
A Tight Lower Bound and Efficient Reduction for Swap Regret
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, and Haifeng Xu · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulation: Information Design in the Age of Generative AI
Keegan Harris, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and Aleksandrs Slivkins · 2023
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Information design in multi-agent reinforcement learning
Yue Lin, Wenhao Li, Hongyuan Zha, and Baoxiang Wang · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Pareto-Optimal Algorithms for Learning in Games
Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, and Jon Schneider · 2024
Closest in time.
Markov persuasion processes: Learning to persuade from scratch
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Francesco Emanuele Stradi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · 2024
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Shinji Ito · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Adversarial bilateral information design
Gabriel Ziegler · 2020
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Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, and Konstantin Zabarnyi · 2021
Cited alongside, same era.
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, and Haifeng Xu · 2021
Cited alongside, same era.
Non-Bayesian Persuasion
Geoffroy de Clippel and Xu Zhang · 2022
Cited alongside, same era.
Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion
Piotr Dworczak and Alessandro Pavan · 2022
Cited alongside, same era.
Selling to Multiple No-Regret Buyers
Linda Cai, S. Matthew Weinberg, Evan Wildenhain, and Shirley Zhang · 2024
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Efficient Prior-Free Mechanisms for No-Regret Agents
Natalie Collina, Aaron Roth, and Han Shao · 2024
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Rationality-robust information design: Bayesian persuasion under quantal response
Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, and Wei Tang · 2024
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Generalized principal-agency: Contracts, information, games and beyond
Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, and Haifeng Xu · 2024
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Contracting with a Learning Agent
Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Joshua Ruizhi Wang, and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2024
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Calibrated Forecasting and Persuasion
Atulya Jain and Vianney Perchet · 2024
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Paying to do better: Games with payments between learning agents
Yoav Kolumbus, Joe Halpern, and Éva Tardos · 2024
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Strategically-Robust Learning Algorithms for Bidding in First-Price Auctions
Rachitesh Kumar, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan · 2024
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Strategizing against No-Regret Learners in First-Price Auctions
Aviad Rubinstein and Junyao Zhao · 2024
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Learning to mitigate externalities: the coase theorem with hindsight rationality
Antoine Scheid, Aymeric Capitaine, Etienne Boursier, Eric Moulines, Michael Jordan, and Alain Oliviero Durmus · 2024
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Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best Response
Kunhe Yang and Hanrui Zhang · 2024
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Information Design with Unknown Prior (Extended Abstract)
Tao Lin and Ce Li · 2025
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