Fetching the paper…
Reading the bibliography…
Many real-life contractual relations differ completely from the clean, static model at the heart of principal-agent theory.
Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play
Hannan, J. (1957) · 1957
Earlier work this paper cites.
Dynamic games and dynamic contract theory
Crawford, V. P. (1985) · 1985
Earlier work this paper cites.
Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives
Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. (1987) · 1987
Earlier work this paper cites.
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Innes, R. D. (1990) · 1990
Earlier work this paper cites.
Incomplete written contracts: Undescribable states of nature
Anderlini, L. and Felli, L. (1994) · 1994
Earlier work this paper cites.
Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity
Bernheim, B. D. and Whinston, M. D. (1998) · 1998
Earlier work this paper cites.
The problematic employment dynamics of student internships
Gregory, D. L. (1998) · 1998
Earlier work this paper cites.
The nonstochastic multiarmed bandit problem
Auer, P., Cesa-Bianchi, N., Freund, Y., and Schapire, R. E. (2002) · 2002
Earlier work this paper cites.
Contract Theory
Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (2005) · 2005
Earlier work this paper cites.
Efficient algorithms for online decision problems
Kalai, A. and Vempala, S. (2005) · 2005
Earlier work this paper cites.
Prediction, learning, and games
Cesa-Bianchi, N. and Lugosi, G. (2006) · 2006
Earlier work this paper cites.
From external to internal regret
Blum, A. and Mansour, Y. (2007) · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
Regret minimization and the price of total anarchy
Blum, A., Hajiaghayi, M., Ligett, K., and Roth, A. (2008) · 2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem
Sannikov, Y. (2008) · 2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
On the convergence of regret minimization dynamics in concave games
Even-Dar, E., Mansour, Y., and Nadav, U. (2009) · 2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Laffont, J.-J. and Martimort, D. (2009) · 2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
The multiplicative weights update method: A meta-algorithm and applications
Arora, S., Hazan, E., and Kale, S. (2012) · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Combinatorial agency
Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., Nisan, N., and Winter, E. (2012) · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problems
Bubeck, S., Cesa-Bianchi, N., et al. (2012) · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Commitment without regrets: Online learning in Stackelberg security games
Balcan, M., Blum, A., Haghtalab, N., and Procaccia, A. D. (2015) · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
No-regret learning in Bayesian games
Hartline, J. D., Syrgkanis, V., and Tardos, É. (2015) · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Econometrics for learning agents
Nekipelov, D., Syrgkanis, V., and Tardos, É. (2015) · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy
Daskalakis, C. and Syrgkanis, V. (2016) · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Correlated and coarse equilibria of single-item auctions
Feldman, M., Lucier, B., and Nisan, N. (2016) · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: Bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
Ho, C., Slivkins, A., and Vaughan, J. W. (2016) · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Near-optimal no-regret learning for correlated equilibria in multi-player general-sum games
Anagnostides, I., Daskalakis, C., Farina, G., Fishelson, M., Golowich, N., and Sandholm, T. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
Optimal collaterals in multi-enterprise investment networks
Babaioff, M., Kolumbus, Y., and Winter, E. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts
Castiglioni, M., Marchesi, A., and Gatti, N. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
Learning approximately optimal contracts
Cohen, A., Deligkas, A., and Koren, M. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
Optimization of scoring rules
Li, Y., Hartline, J. D., Shan, L., and Wu, Y. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
Strategizing against learners in Bayesian games
Mansour, Y., Mohri, M., Schneider, J., and Sivan, B. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
alphaXiv searches the wider corpus for related work and actual follow-ups.
alphaXiv is searching for related work…
Learning and efficiency in games with dynamic population
Lykouris, T., Syrgkanis, V., and Tardos, É. (2016) · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Selling to a no-regret buyer
Braverman, M., Mao, J., Schneider, J., and Weinberg, S. M. (2018) · 2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Simple versus optimal contracts
Dütting, P., Roughgarden, T., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2019) · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
How do classifiers induce agents to invest effort strategically?
Kleinberg, J. and Raghavan, M. (2019) · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Introduction to multi-armed bandits
Slivkins, A. (2019) · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Mechanisms for a no-regret agent: Beyond the common prior
Camara, M. K., Hartline, J. D., and Johnsen, A. C. (2020) · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Contracts with information acquisition, via scoring rules
Papireddygari, M. and Waggoner, B. (2022) · 2022
Later among the works it cites.
Bayesian analysis of linear contracts
Alon, T., Dütting, P., Li, Y., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Is learning in games good for the learners?
Brown, W., Schneider, J., and Vodrahalli, K. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Selling to multiple no-regret buyers
Cai, L., Weinberg, S. M., Wildenhain, E., and Zhang, S. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Multi-agent contract design: How to commission multiple agents with individual outcomes
Castiglioni, M., Marchesi, A., and Gatti, N. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Optimal no-regret learning of one-sided Lipschitz functions
Dütting, P., Guruganesh, G., Schneider, J., and Wang, J. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
The power of menus in contract design
Guruganesh, G., Schneider, J., Wang, J. R., and Zhao, J. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Learning in online principal-agent interactions: The power of menus
Han, M., Albert, M., and Xu, H. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Steering no-regret learners to optimal equilibria
Zhang, B. H., Farina, G., Anagnostides, I., Cacciamani, F., McAleer, S. M., Haupt, A. A., Celli, A., Gatti, N., Conitzer, V., and Sandholm, T. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
The sample complexity of online contract design
Zhu, B., Bates, S., Yang, Z., Wang, Y., Jiao, J., and Jordan, M. I. (2023) · 2023
Later among the works it cites.
Principal-agent reward shaping in MDPs
Ben-Porat, O., Mansour, Y., Moshkovitz, M., and Taitler, B. (2024) · 2024
Closest in time.
Combinatorial contracts beyond gross substitutes
Dütting, P., Feldman, M., and Gal Tzur, Y. (2024) · 2024
Closest in time.
On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
Vuong, R. D., Dughmi, S., Patel, N., and Prasad, A. (2024) · 2024
Closest in time.