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Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms.
A social equilibrium existence theorem
Gerard Debreu · 1952
Earlier work this paper cites.
Fixed-point and minimax theorems in locally convex topological linear spaces
Ky Fan · 1952
Earlier work this paper cites.
A further generalization of the kakutani fixed point theorem, with application to nash equilibrium points
Irving L Glicksberg · 1952
Earlier work this paper cites.
Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics
Matthew Rabin · 1993
Earlier work this paper cites.
Auctions with cross-shareholdings
Sudipto Dasgupta and Kevin Tsui · 2004
Earlier work this paper cites.
Dynamics of bid optimization in online advertisement auctions
Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Kamal Jain, Omid Etesami, and Mohammad Mahdian · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
Settling the complexity of computing two-player nash equilibria
Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng, and Shang-Hua Teng · 2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
Auctions: A survey of experimental research, 1995-2010
John H Kagel and Dan Levin · 2011
Earlier work this paper cites.
Complexity and approximation: Combinatorial optimization problems and their approximability properties
Giorgio Ausiello, Pierluigi Crescenzi, Giorgio Gambosi, Viggo Kann, Alberto Marchetti-Spaccamela, and Marco Protasi · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Inequality aversion and externalities
Marc Gürtler and Oliver Gürtler · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Measuring the distribution of spitefulness
Erik O Kimbrough and J Philipp Reiss · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Sequential auctions and externalities
Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Éva Tardos · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions: a game theoretic approach
Denis Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R Devanur, and Lei Wang · 2013
Earlier work this paper cites.
Optimizing budget constrained spend in search advertising
Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta, and Ramakrishnan Srikant · 2013
Earlier work this paper cites.
Why marketplace experimentation is harder than it seems: The role of test-control interference
Thomas Blake and Dominic Coey · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
Feedback control of real-time display advertising
Weinan Zhang, Yifei Rong, Jun Wang, Tianchi Zhu, and Xiaofan Wang · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Inapproximability of nash equilibrium
Aviad Rubinstein · 2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Autobidding with constraints
Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, and Aranyak Mehta · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Learning in repeated auctions with budgets: Regret minimization and equilibrium
Santiago R Balseiro and Yonatan Gur · 2019
Cited alongside, same era.
Credible auctions: A trilemma
Mohammad Akbarpour and Shengwu Li · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
The complexity of pacing for second-price auctions
Xi Chen, Christian Kroer, and Rachitesh Kumar · 2021
Later among the works it cites.
Throttling equilibria in auction markets
Xi Chen, Christian Kroer, and Rachitesh Kumar · 2021
Later among the works it cites.
Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo · 2021
Later among the works it cites.
First-price auctions in online display advertising
Stylianos Despotakis, R Ravi, and Amin Sayedi · 2021
Later among the works it cites.
On the complexity of equilibrium computation in first-price auctions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Philip Lazos, and Diogo Poças · 2021
Later among the works it cites.
Auction design for roi-constrained buyers
Negin Golrezaei, Ilan Lobel, and Renato Paes Leme · 2021
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First-order methods for large-scale market equilibrium computation
Yuan Gao and Christian Kroer · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
A counterfactual framework for seller-side a/b testing on marketplaces
Viet Ha-Thuc, Avishek Dutta, Ren Mao, Matthew Wood, and Yunli Liu · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Trustworthy online marketplace experimentation with budget-split design
Min Liu, Jialiang Mao, and Kang Kang · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Why do competitive markets converge to first-price auctions?
Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, and Yifeng Teng · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Non-quasi-linear agents in quasi-linear mechanisms
Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, and Brendan Lucier · 2021
Cited alongside, same era.
Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo · 2021
Cited alongside, same era.
Later among the works it cites.
Public goods games in directed networks
Christos Papadimitriou and Binghui Peng · 2021
Later among the works it cites.
The best of many worlds: Dual mirror descent for online allocation problems
Santiago R Balseiro, Haihao Lu, and Vahab Mirrokni · 2022
Closest in time.
Pacing equilibrium in first price auction markets
Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Nicolas E Stier-Moses, Eric Sodomka, and Christopher A Wilkens · 2022
Closest in time.
Multiplicative pacing equilibria in auction markets
Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Eric Sodomka, and Nicolas E Stier-Moses · 2022
Closest in time.
Efficiency of the first-price auction in the autobidding world
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, Hanrui Zhang, and Song Zuo · 2022
Closest in time.
Efficiency of non-truthful auctions under auto-bidding
Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, and Andres Perlroth · 2022
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Faqs about adsense moving to a first-price auction
Google · 2024
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