Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World

Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders

William Vickrey · 1961

Earlier work this paper cites.

Worst-case equilibria

Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou · 1999

Earlier work this paper cites.

Equilibrium in sealed high bid auctions

Eric Maskin and John Riley · 2000

Earlier work this paper cites.

Composable and efficient mechanisms

Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos · 2013

Earlier work this paper cites.

Price of anarchy for auction revenue

Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, and Sam Taggart · 2014

Earlier work this paper cites.

A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions

Darrell Hoy, Samuel Taggart, and Zihe Wang · 2018

Earlier work this paper cites.

Autobidding with constraints

Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, and Aranyak Mehta · 2019

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Why do competitive markets converge to first-price auctions?

Renato Paes Leme, Balasubramanian Sivan, and Yifeng Teng · 2020

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Non-quasi-linear agents in quasi-linear mechanisms

Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, and Brendan Lucier · 2021

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Robust auction design in the auto-bidding world

Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, and Song Zuo · 2021

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Towards efficient auctions in an auto-bidding world

Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo · 2021

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The landscape of auto-bidding auctions: Value versus utility maximization

Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo

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Optimal mechanisms for value maximizers with budget constraints via target clipping

Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni, and Song Zuo · 2022

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US Programmatic Digital Display Ad Spending Will Grow Despite Pandemic-Related Recession

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First price auction is 1 - 1/e 2 {}^{\mbox{2}} efficient

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Yaonan Jin and Pinyan Lu · 2022

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Efficiency of non-truthful auctions under auto-bidding, 2022

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Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, and Andres Perlroth · 2022

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Auction design in an auto-bidding setting: Randomization improves efficiency beyond vcg

Aranyak Sitanshu Mehta · 2022

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