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2019

Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate Risk-Limiting Audits: SHANGRLA

Stark, Philip B.

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Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be reduced to testing sets of null hypotheses of the form "the average of this list is not greater than 1/2" for a collection of finite lists of nonnegative numbers.

Such social choice functions include majority, super-majority, plurality, multi-winner plurality, Instant Runoff Voting (IRV), Borda count, approval voting, and STAR-Voting, among others.
The audit stops without a full hand count iff all the null hypotheses are rejected.
The nulls can be tested in many ways.

Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate Risk-Limiting Audits: SHANGRLA · Around

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Blom, M., Stuckey, P.J., Teague, V.: Risk-limiting audits for irv elections. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.08804 (2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.08804
Original
1903
Earlier work this paper cites.
Feller, W.: An introduction to probability theory and its applications. Vol. II. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York (1971)
1971
Earlier work this paper cites.
Stark, P.: Conservative statistical post-election audits. Ann. Appl. Stat. 2
Original
2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
Stark, P.: A sharper discrepancy measure for post-election audits. Ann. Appl. Stat. 2
Original
2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
Stark, P.: CAST: Canvass audits by sampling and testing. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Special Issue on Electronic Voting 4
2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
Stark, P.: Risk-limiting post-election audits: P P -values from common probability inequalities. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 4
2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
American Statistical Association: American Statistical Association statement on risk-limiting post-election audits. www.amstat.org/outreach/pdfs/Risk-Limiting_Endorsement.pdf (2010)
2010
Earlier work this paper cites.
Stark, P.: Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audits. In: Proceedings of the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’10). USENIX (2010), http://www.usenix.org/events/evtwote10/tech/full_papers/Stark.pdf
2010
Earlier work this paper cites.
Benaloh, J., Jones, D., Lazarus, E., Lindeman, M., Stark, P.: SOBA: Secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audits. In: Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11). USENIX (2011), http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/soba11.pdf
2011
Earlier work this paper cites.

Similar

Higgins, M., Rivest, R., Stark, P.: Sharper p-values for stratified post-election audits. Statistics, Politics, and Policy 2
2011
Cited alongside, same era.
Bañuelos, J., Stark, P.: Limiting risk by turning manifest phantoms into evil zombies. Tech. rep., arXiv.org (2012), http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.3413 , retrieved 17 July 2012
Original
2012
Cited alongside, same era.
Lindeman, M., Stark, P.: A gentle introduction to risk-limiting audits. IEEE Security and Privacy 10
2012
Cited alongside, same era.
Lindeman, M., Stark, P., Yates, V.: BRAVO: Ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes. In: Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11). USENIX (2012)
2012
Cited alongside, same era.
Stark, P.B., Wagner, D.A.: Evidence-based elections. IEEE Security and Privacy 10

Then

Bernhard, M., Halderman, J., Rivest, R., Vora, P., Ryan, P., Teague, V., Benaloh, J., Stark, P., Wallach, D.: Public evidence from secret ballots. In: Krimmer, R., Volkamer, M., Binder, N.B., Kersting, N., Pereira, O., Schürmann, C. (eds.) Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 10615. Springer (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_6
2017
Later among the works it cites.
Lindeman, M., McBurnett, N., Ottoboni, K., Stark, P.: Next steps for the Colorado risk-limiting audit (CORLA) program. https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.00698 (2018)
Original
2018
Later among the works it cites.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine: Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy. The National Academies Press, Washington, DC (Sep 2018). https://doi.org/10.17226/25120
2018
Later among the works it cites.
Ottoboni, K., Stark, P., Lindeman, M., McBurnett, N.: Risk-limiting audits by stratified union-intersection tests of elections (suite). In: Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer (2018), https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_12 , preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.04235

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2012

Cited alongside, same era.

Kaczmarek, T., Wittrock, J., Carback, R., Florescu, A., Rubio, J., Runyan, N., Vora, P., Zagorski, F.: Dispute resolution in accessible voting systems: The design and use of audiotegrity. In: Heather, J., Schneider, S., Teague, V. (eds.) E-Voting and Identity: 4th International Conference, Vote-ID 2013, Guildford, UK, July 2013. LNCS Volume 7985, pp. 127–141. Springer (2013)

2013

Cited alongside, same era.

Presidential Commission on Election Administration: The American Voting Experience: Report and recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf (2014)

2014

Cited alongside, same era.

Stark, P.B., Teague, V.: Verifiable european elections: Risk-limiting audits for d’hondt and its relatives. JETS: USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems 3.1

2014

Cited alongside, same era.

2018

Later among the works it cites.

Stark, P.: An introduction to risk-limiting audits and evidence-based elections, written testimony prepared for the Little Hoover Commission. https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/lhc18.pdf (2018)

2018

Later among the works it cites.

Appel, A., DeMillo, R., Stark, P.: Ballot-marking devices cannot assure the will of the voters. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3375755 (2019)

2019

Closest in time.

Ottoboni, K., Bernhard, M., Halderman, A., Rivest, R., Stark, P.: Bernoulli ballot polling: A manifest improvement for risk-limiting audits. Voting ’19 (2019), preprint: http://arxiv.org/abs/1812.06361

2019

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Bernhard, M., McDonald, A., Meng, H., Hwa, J., Bajaj, N., Chang, K., Halderman, J.: Can voters detect malicious manipulation of ballot marking devices? In: 41st IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. p. (in press). IEEE (2020)

2020

Closest in time.