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2012

Limiting Risk by Turning Manifest Phantoms into Evil Zombies

Banuelos, Jorge H., Stark, Philip B.

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Understand

Drawing a random sample of ballots to conduct a risk-limiting audit generally requires knowing how the ballots cast in an election are organized into groups, for instance, how many containers of ballots there are in all and how many ballots are in each container.

A list of the ballot group identifiers along with number of ballots in each group is called a ballot manifest.
What if the ballot manifest is not accurate? Surprisingly, even if ballots are known to be missing from the manifest, it is not necessary to make worst-case assumptions about those ballots--for instance, to adjust the margin by the number of missing ballots--to ensure that the audit remains conservative.
Rather, it suffices to make worst-case assumptions about the individual randomly selected ballots that the audit cannot find.

Limiting Risk by Turning Manifest Phantoms into Evil Zombies · Around

Built on

On the notion of ‘software independence’ in voting systems
Rivest, R. (2008) · 2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
Efficient post-election audits of multiple contests: 2009 California tests
Stark, P. (2009a) · 2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot risk-limiting audits
Stark, P. (2010) · 2010
Earlier work this paper cites.
SOBA: Secrecy-preserving observable ballot-level audits
Benaloh, J., Jones, D., Lazarus, E., Lindeman, M., and Stark, P. (2011) · 2011
Earlier work this paper cites.

Similar

Single-ballot risk-limiting audits using convex optimization
Checkoway, S., Sarwate, A., and Shacham, H. (2010) · 2011
Cited alongside, same era.
Principles and best practices for post-election audits
Lindeman, M., Halvorson, M., Smith, P., Garland, L., Addona, V., and McCrea, D. (2008) · 2011
Cited alongside, same era.
BRAVO: Ballot-polling risk-limiting audits to verify outcomes
Lindeman, M., Stark, P., and Yates, V. (2012) · 2012
Cited alongside, same era.
Conservative statistical post-election audits
Stark, P. (2008a)
Cited in the paper.
A sharper discrepancy measure for post-election audits
Stark, P. (2008b)
Cited in the paper.
Risk-limiting post-election audits: P P -values from common probability inequalities
Stark, P. (2009b)
Cited in the paper.

Then

A gentle introduction to risk-limiting audits
Lindeman, M. and Stark, P. B. (2012) · 2012
Closest in time.
On the notion of “software independence” in voting systems (draft version of July 28, 2006)
Rivest, R. and Wack, J. (2006) · 2012
Closest in time.
Evidence-based elections
Original
Stark, P. B. and Wagner, D. A. (2012) · 2012
Closest in time.

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