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The Spectre vulnerability in modern processors has been widely reported.
A. Kejariwal, A. V. Veidenbaum, A. Nicolau, X. Tian, M. Girkar, H. Saito, and U. Banerjee, “Comparative architectural characterization of spec cpu2000 and cpu2006 benchmarks on the intel® core™ 2 duo processor,” in
2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
L. Xu, F. Sun, and Z. Su, “Constructing precise control flow graphs from binaries,”
2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
D. Brumley, I. Jager, T. Avgerinos, and E. J. Schwartz, “BAP: A binary analysis platform,” in
2011
Earlier work this paper cites.
Y. Yarom and K. Falkner, “Flush+reload: a high resolution, low noise, l3 cache side-channel attack,” in
2014
Earlier work this paper cites.
F. Peng, Z. Deng, X. Zhang, D. Xu, Z. Lin, and Z. Su, “X-force: Force-executing binary programs for security applications.” in
2014
Earlier work this paper cites.
J. L. Henning, “SPEC CPU2006 benchmark descriptions,”
2014
Earlier work this paper cites.
Y. Shoshitaishvili, R. Wang, C. Salls, N. Stephens, M. Polino, A. Dutcher, J. Grosen, S. Feng, C. Hauser, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna, “SoK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis,” in
2016
Earlier work this paper cites.
J. L. Hennessy and D. A. Patterson,
2017
Earlier work this paper cites.
D. Gruss, M. Lipp, M. Schwarz, R. Fellner, C. Maurice, and S. Mangard, “Kaslr is dead: long live kaslr,” in
2017
Earlier work this paper cites.
K. Kim, I. L. Kim, C. H. Kim, Y. Kwon, Y. Zheng, X. Zhang, and D. Xu, “J-force: Forced execution on javascript,” in
2017
Cited alongside, same era.
M. community, “C++ developer guidance for speculative execution side channels,”
2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Intel, “Intel analysis of speculative execution side channels,”
2018
Cited alongside, same era.
E. M. Koruyeh, K. N. Khasawneh, C. Song, and N. Abu-Ghazaleh, “Spectre returns! speculation attacks using the return stack buffer,” in
2018
Cited alongside, same era.
V. Kiriansky and C. Waldspurger, “Speculative buffer overflows: Attacks and defenses,”
2018
Cited alongside, same era.
T. Warren, “Intel processors are being redesigned to protect against spectre,”
2018
Closest in time.
C. Reis, “Mitigating spectre with site isolation in chrome,”
2018
Closest in time.
P. Turner, “Retpoline: a software construct for preventing branch-target-injection,” 2018
2018
Closest in time.
2018
Closest in time.
M. Maurer, “Holmes: Binary Analysis Integration Through Datalog,” 10 2018. [Online]. Available:
2018
Closest in time.
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2018
Cited alongside, same era.
M. Yan, J. Choi, D. Skarlatos, A. Morrison, C. W. Fletcher, and J. Torrellas, “Invisispec: Making speculative execution invisible in the cache hierarchy,” in
2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Microsoft, “Spectre mitigations in msvc,”
2018
Cited alongside, same era.
P. Kocher, “Spectre mitigations in microsoft’s C/C++ compiler,”
Cited in the paper.
“Meltdown and Spectre,”
Cited in the paper.
——, “Retpoline: A branch target injection mitigation,”
Cited in the paper.
V. Kiriansky, I. Lebedev, S. Amarasinghe, S. Devadas, and J. Emer, “Dawg: A defense against cache timing attacks in speculative execution processors.”
Cited in the paper.
wikichip, “Macro-operation fusion,”
2018
Closest in time.
Google, “oss-fuzz,”
2018
Closest in time.
P. Kocher, J. Horn, A. Fogh, , D. Genkin, D. Gruss, W. Haas, M. Hamburg, M. Lipp, S. Mangard, T. Prescher, M. Schwarz, and Y. Yarom, “Spectre attacks: Exploiting speculative execution,” in
2019
Closest in time.