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This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract.
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
Robert D Innes · 1990
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An analysis of the principal-agent problem
Sanford J Grossman and Oliver D Hart · 1992
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Microeconomic theory
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Dennis Whinston, Jerry R Green, et al · 1995
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The use of performance measures in incentive contracting
George Baker · 2000
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Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
Shuchi Chawla, Jason D Hartline, and Robert Kleinberg · 2007
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Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to
Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, and Kamesh Munagala · 2009
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The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model
Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort · 2009
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Dezsö Szalay · 2009
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Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, and Eyal Winter · 2012
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Simple and nearly optimal multi-item auctions
Yang Cai and Zhiyi Huang · 2013
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Health insurance as a two-part pricing contract
Darius Lakdawalla and Neeraj Sood · 2013
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Hector Chade and Virginia N Vera de Serio · 2014
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Incentivizing high quality crowdwork
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Siddharth Suri, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan · 2015
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Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: Bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan · 2016
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Simple versus optimal contracts
Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2019
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Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, and Xinzhi Zhang · 2019
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Learning optimal strategies to commit to
Binghui Peng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, and Song Zuo · 2019
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Clément L Canonne · 2020
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Blockchain and contract theory: modeling smart contracts using insurance markets
Bayesian analysis of linear contracts
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2023
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Learning optimal contracts: How to exploit small action spaces
Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · 2023
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Online information acquisition: Hiring multiple agents
Federico Cacciamani, Matteo Castiglioni, and Nicola Gatti · 2023
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Strong revenue (non-)monotonicity of single-parameter auctions
Ziyun Chen, Zhiyi Huang, Dorsa Majdi, and Zipeng Yan · 2023
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Multi-agent contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2023
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Alpen Sheth and Hemang Subramanian · 2020
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Contracts with private cost per unit-of-effort
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2021
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Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · 2021
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Combinatorial contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2021
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The complexity of contracts
P. Dütting, T. Roughgarden, and I. Talgam-Cohen · 2021
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Generalizing complex hypotheses on product distributions: Auctions, prophet inequalities, and Pandora’s problem
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, Zhihao Gavin Tang, and Xinzhi Zhang · 2021
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Contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, and Joshua R. Wang · 2021
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Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, and Yoav Gal Tzur · 2023
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Optimal no-regret learning for one-sided Lipschitz functions
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Learning reserve prices in second-price auctions
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, and Tao Xiao · 2023
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On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
Ramiro Deo-Campo Vuong, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel, and Aditya Prasad · 2023
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Deep contract design via discontinuous piecewise affine neural networks
Tonghan Wang, Paul Dütting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and David C Parkes · 2023
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The sample complexity of online contract design
Banghua Zhu, Stephen Bates, Zhuoran Yang, Yixin Wang, Jiantao Jiao, and Michael I. Jordan · 2023
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