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We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes.
Learning and approximating the optimal strategy to commit to
Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, and Kamesh Munagala · 2009
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Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: Bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan · 2014
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Robustness and linear contracts
Gabriel Carroll · 2015
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Analysis of medicare pay-for-performance contracts
Hamsa Bastani, Mohsen Bayati, Mark Braverman, Ramki Gummadi, and Ramesh Johari · 2016
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Blockchain disruption and smart contracts
Lin William Cong and Zhiguo He · 2019
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Simple versus optimal contracts
Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2019
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Learning optimal strategies to commit to
Binghui Peng, Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, and Song Zuo · 2019
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Contracts with private cost per unit-of-effort
Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2021
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Sample-efficient learning of stackelberg equilibria in general-sum games
Yu Bai, Chi Jin, Huan Wang, and Caiming Xiong · 2021
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The complexity of contracts
Paul Dutting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2021
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Contracts under moral hazard and adverse selection
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, and Joshua R Wang · 2021
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Bayesian agency: Linear versus tractable contracts
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · 2022
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Learning approximately optimal contracts
Alon Cohen, Argyrios Deligkas, and Moran Koren · 2022
Cited alongside, same era.
Combinatorial contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2022
Cited alongside, same era.
Multi-agent contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2023
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The power of menus in contract design
Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua Wang, and Junyao Zhao · 2023
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Learning in online principle-agent interactions: The power of menus
Minbiao Han, Michael Albert, and Haifeng Xu · 2023
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No-regret learning in dynamic stackelberg games
Niklas Lauffer, Mahsa Ghasemi, Abolfazl Hashemi, Yagiz Savas, and Ufuk Topcu · 2023
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The sample complexity of online contract design
Banghua Zhu, Stephen Bates, Zhuoran Yang, Yixin Wang, Jiantao Jiao, and Michael I. Jordan · 2023
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On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
Ramiro Deo-Campo Vuong, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel, and Aditya Prasad · 2024
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Bayesian analysis of linear contracts
Tal Alon, Paul Duetting, Yingkai Li, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2023
Cited alongside, same era.
Designing menus of contracts efficiently: The power of randomization
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti
Cited in the paper.
Multi-agent contract design: How to commission multiple agents with individual outcomes
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti
Cited in the paper.
Combinatorial contracts beyond gross substitutes
Paul Dutting, Michal Feldman, and Yoav Gal Tzur · 2024
Closest in time.