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A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds.
A simplified two-person poker
H. W. Kuhn · 1950
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An approach to communication equilibria
Francoise Forges · 1986
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Multistage games with communication
Roger B Myerson · 1986
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Game Theory
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole · 1991
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Worst-case equilibria
Elias Koutsoupias and Christos Papadimitriou · 1999
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The nonstochastic multiarmed bandit problem
Peter Auer, Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E. Schapire · 2002
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On the performance of user equilibria in traffic networks
Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolás E. Stier Moses · 2003
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K-implementation
Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz · 2004
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Selfish routing and the price of anarchy
Tim Roughgarden · 2005
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Regret minimization in games with incomplete information
Martin Zinkevich, Michael Bowling, Michael Johanson, and Carmelo Piccione · 2007
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Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler, and Tim Roughgarden · 2008
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Extensive-form correlated equilibrium: Definition and computational complexity
Bernhard von Stengel and Françoise Forges · 2008
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The price of stability in selfish scheduling games
Lucas Agussurja and Hoong Chuin Lau · 2009
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Improved equilibria via public service advertising
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Yishay Mansour · 2009
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Leading dynamics to good behavior
Maria-Florina Balcan · 2011
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Bayesian persuasion
Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow · 2011
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Beyond the nash equilibrium barrier
Robert D. Kleinberg, Katrina Ligett, Georgios Piliouras, and Éva Tardos · 2011
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Circumventing the price of anarchy: Leading dynamics to good behavior
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Yishay Mansour · 2013
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Near-optimality in covering games by exposing global information
Maria-Florina Balcan, Sara Krehbiel, Georgios Piliouras, and Jinwoo Shin · 2014
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Solving large imperfect information games using CFR+
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Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and Éva Tardos · 2015
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Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Tim Roughgarden · 2015
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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris · 2016
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Complexity and algorithms of k-implementation
Yuan Deng, Pingzhong Tang, and Shuran Zheng · 2016
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Average case performance of replicator dynamics in potential games via computing regions of attraction
Ioannis Panageas and Georgios Piliouras · 2016
Learning in two-player zero-sum partially observable markov games with perfect recall
Tadashi Kozuno, Pierre Ménard, Remi Munos, and Michal Valko · 2021
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Near-optimal learning of extensive-form games with imperfect information
Yu Bai, Chi Jin, Song Mei, and Tiancheng Yu · 2022
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Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2022
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Auctions between regret-minimizing agents
Yoav Kolumbus and Noam Nisan · 2022
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Inducing equilibria via incentives: Simultaneous design-and-play ensures global convergence
Boyi Liu, Jiayang Li, Zhuoran Yang, Hoi-To Wai, Mingyi Hong, Yu Nie, and Zhaoran Wang · 2022
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Online prediction with selfish experts
Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers · 2017
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Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, and Matt Weinberg · 2018
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Strategizing against no-regret learners
Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan · 2019
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Correlation in extensive-form games: Saddle-point formulation and benchmarks
Gabriele Farina, Chun Kai Ling, Fei Fang, and Tuomas Sandholm · 2019
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Coordinating the crowd: Inducing desirable equilibria in non-cooperative systems
David Mguni, Joel Jennings, Emilio Sison, Sergio Valcarcel Macua, Sofia Ceppi, and Enrique Munoz de Cote · 2019
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Mechanisms for a no-regret agent: Beyond the common prior
Modibo K Camara, Jason D Hartline, and Aleck Johnsen · 2020
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Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri, Jon Schneider, and Balasubramanian Sivan · 2022
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Polynomial-time optimal equilibria with a mediator in extensive-form games
Brian Hu Zhang and Tuomas Sandholm · 2022
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Optimal correlated equilibria in general-sum extensive-form games: Fixed-parameter algorithms, hardness, and two-sided column-generation
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, and Tuomas Sandholm · 2022
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Is learning in games good for the learners?
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Liquid welfare guarantees for no-regret learning in sequential budgeted auctions
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Computing optimal equilibria and mechanisms via learning in zero-sum extensive-form games
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