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We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task.
Moral hazard and observability
Holmström, B. (1979) · 1979
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Moral hazard in teams
Holmström, B. (1982) · 1982
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An analysis of the principal-agent problem
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1983) · 1983
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Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Gul, F. and Stacchetti, E. (1999) · 1999
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Verifying gross substitutability
Reijnierse, H., Potters, J., and Gellekom, A. (2002) · 2002
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Combinatorial agency
Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., and Nisan, N. (2006) · 2006
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Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Lehmann, B., Lehmann, D., and Nisan, N. (2006) · 2006
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Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., and Nisan, N. (2009) · 2009
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On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
Feige, U. (2009) · 2009
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Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., and Nisan, N. (2010) · 2010
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Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
Chawla, S., Hartline, J. D., Malec, D. L., and Sivan, B. (2010) · 2010
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Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Bhawalkar, K. and Roughgarden, T. (2011) · 2011
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Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
Emek, Y. and Feldman, M. (2012) · 2012
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Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding
Fu, H., Kleinberg, R., and Lavi, R. (2012) · 2012
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Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
Feldman, M., Fu, H., Gravin, N., and Lucier, B. (2013) · 2013
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Composable and efficient mechanisms
Syrgkanis, V. and Tardos, É. (2013) · 2013
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Combinatorial auctions via posted prices
Feldman, M., Gravin, N., and Lucier, B. (2015) · 2015
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An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications
Yao, A. C.-C. (2015) · 2015
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Bayesian combinatorial auctions
Christodoulou, G., Kovács, A., and Schapira, M. (2016) · 2016
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Optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature
Sviridenko, M., Vondrák, J., and Ward, J. (2017) · 2017
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Delegated search approximates efficient search
Kleinberg, J. M. and Kleinberg, R. (2018) · 2018
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Simple versus optimal contracts
Dütting, P., Roughgarden, T., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2019) · 2019
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Submodular maximization beyond non-negativity: Guarantees, fast algorithms, and applications
Harshaw, C., Feldman, M., Ward, J., and Karbasi, A. (2019) · 2019
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How do classifiers induce agents to invest effort strategically?
Kleinberg, J. M. and Raghavan, M. (2019) · 2019
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A constant factor prophet inequality for online combinatorial auctions
Correa, J. and Cristi, A. (2023) · 2023
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Multi-agent contracts
Dütting, P., Ezra, T., Feldman, M., and Kesselheim, T. (2023) · 2023
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Simple and approximately optimal contracts for payment for ecosystem services
Li, W. D., Ashlagi, I., and Lo, I. (2023) · 2023
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Multi-agent contract design beyond binary actions
Cacciamani, F., Bernasconi, M., Castiglioni, M., and Gatti, N. (2024) · 2024
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Optimal scoring rule design under partial knowledge
Chen, Y. and Yu, F. (2024) · 2024
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On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
Deo-Campo Vuong, R., Dughmi, S., Patel, N., and Prasad, A. (2024) · 2024
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Prophet inequalities made easy: Stochastic optimization by pricing nonstochastic inputs
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Instagram influencer marketing spending worldwide from 2013 to 2020
Statista (2021) · 2020
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Improved truthful mechanisms for subadditive combinatorial auctions: Breaking the logarithmic barrier
Assadi, S., Kesselheim, T., and Singla, S. (2021) · 2021
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Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
Dobzinski, S. (2021) · 2021
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The complexity of contracts
Dütting, P., Roughgarden, T., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2021) · 2021
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Contract design for afforestation programs
Li, W. D., Immorlica, N., and Lucier, B. (2021) · 2021
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Algorithmic contract theory: A survey
Dütting, P., Feldman, M., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2024) · 2024
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On the (in)approximability of combinatorial contracts
Ezra, T., Feldman, M., and Schlesinger, M. (2024) · 2024
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Multi-agent contract design with a budget
Goel, S. and Caruthers-Wade, H. (2024) · 2024
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Principal-agent meets a cardinality
Gong, Q., Gai, L., Lv, Y., and Yang, R. (2024) · 2024
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Welfare and beyond in multi-agent contracts
Aharoni, G., Hoefer, M., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2025) · 2025
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Multi-project contracts
Alon, T., Castiglioni, M., Chen, J., Ezra, T., Li, Y., and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2025) · 2025
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Incentive design with spillovers
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Multi-agent combinatorial contracts
Dütting, P., Ezra, T., Feldman, M., and Kesselheim, T. (2025c) · 2025
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Combinatorial contract design: Recent progress and emerging frontiers
Feldman, M. (2025) · 2025
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Budget-feasible contracts
Feldman, M., Tzur, Y. G., Ponitka, T., and Schlesinger, M. (2025) · 2025
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One action too many: Inapproximability of budgeted combinatorial contracts
Feldman, M., Gal-Tzur, Y., Ponitka, T., and Schlesinger, M. (2026) · 2026
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