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Contract theory studies how a principal can incentivize agents to exert costly, unobservable effort through performance-based payments.
Mathematical techniques for efficient record segmentation in large shared databases
Mark J Eisner and Dennis G Severance · 1976
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Moral hazard and observability
Bengt Holmström · 1979
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Sensitivity analysis for combinatorial optimization
Daniel Mier Gusfield · 1980
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Moral hazard in teams
Bengt Holmström · 1982
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Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes
Alexander S Kelso and Vincent P Crawford · 1982
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An analysis of the principal-agent problem
Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart · 1983
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Convergence of Stochastic Processes
David Pollard · 1984
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Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives
Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom · 1987
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Regulating trade among agents
Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom · 1990
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Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Bengt Holmström and Paul Milgrom · 1991
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Incentives to help in multi-agent situations
Hideshi Itoh · 1991
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Efficiency in partnerships
Patrick Legros and Hitoshi Matsushima · 1991
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Well-layered maps-a class of greedily optimizable set functions
Andreas WM Dress and Werner Terhalle · 1995
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Clique is hard to approximate within n 1-ε
J. Hastad · 1996
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A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
Uriel Feige · 1998
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Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
Faruk Gul and Ennio Stacchetti · 1999
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The theory of moral hazard and unobservable behaviour: Part I
James A. Mirrlees · 1999
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Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann, and Noam Nisan · 2001
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Combinatorial agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, and Noam Nisan · 2006
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Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, and Noam Nisan · 2006
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Combinatorial auctions
Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan · 2006
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The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
Noam Nisan and Ilya Segal · 2006
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Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number
David Zuckerman · 2006
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A strongly polynomial algorithm for line search in submodular polyhedra
Kiyohito Nagano · 2007
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Combinatorial auctions
Noam Nisan · 2007
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On the computational power of demand queries
Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan · 2009
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combinatorial strongly polynomial algorithm for minimizing submodular functions
Satoru Iwata, Lisa Fleischer, and Satoru Fujishige · 2009
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Combinatorial agency
Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, and Eyal Winter · 2012
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Adaptive contract design for crowdsourcing markets: Bandit algorithms for repeated principal-agent problems
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan · 2014
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Optimum statistical estimation with strategic data sources
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and Christos H. Papadimitriou · 2015
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Multi-agent contract design: How to commission multiple agents with individual outcome
Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, and Nicola Gatti · 2023
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Multi-agent contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2023
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Ambiguous contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz, and Larry Samuelson · 2023
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Estimating effects of incentive contracts in online labor platforms
Nur Kaynar and Auyon Siddiq · 2023
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Deep contract design via discontinuous networks
Tonghan Wang, Paul Dütting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and David C. Parkes · 2023
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The sample complexity of online contract design
Banghua Zhu, Stephen Bates, Zhuoran Yang, Yixin Wang, Jiantao Jiao, and Michael I. Jordan · 2023
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The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics: Scientific background
nobelprize.org · 2016
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Daniel Lehmann · 2017
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Gross substitutability: An algorithmic survey
Renato Paes Leme · 2017
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The Economics of Contracts: A Primer
Bernard Salanié · 2017
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Optimal approximation for submodular and supermodular optimization with bounded curvature
Maxim Sviridenko, Jan Vondrák, and Justin Ward · 2017
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Evidence of upcoding in pay-for-performance programs
Hamsa Bastani, Joel Goh, and Mohsen Bayati · 2018
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Multi-agent contract design beyond binary actions
Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, and Nicola Gatti · 2024
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On supermodular contracts and dense subgraphs
Ramiro Deo-Campo Vuong, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel, and Aditya Prasad · 2024
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Combinatorial contracts beyond gross substitutes
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, and Yoav Gal-Tzur · 2024
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Algorithmic contract theory: A survey
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2024
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On the (in)approximability of combinatorial contracts
Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger · 2024
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Incentivizing quality text generation via statistical contracts
Eden Saig, Ohad Einav, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2024
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Welfare and beyond in multi-agent contracts
Gil Aharoni, Martin Hoefer, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2025
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Multi-project contracts
Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Tomer Ezra, Yingkai Li, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2025
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Combinatorial contracts through demand types
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger · 2025
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Combinatorial contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2025
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Multi-agent combinatorial contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim · 2025
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The pseudo-dimension of contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka, and Ermis Soumalias · 2025
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Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, and Yarden Rashti · 2025
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Ultra-efficient contracts: Breaking the substitutes barrier in combinatorial contracts
Michal Feldman and Liat Yashin · 2025
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Budget-feasible contracts
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Multi-agent contract design with a budget, 2025
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When contracts get complex: Information-theoretic barriers
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, and Aviad Rubinstein · 2026
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Contract design beyond hidden actions
Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, and Matteo Russo · 2026
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