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Can a principal still offer optimal dynamic contracts that are linear in end-of-period outcomes when the agent controls a process that exhibits memory? We provide a positive answer by considering a general Gaussian setting where the output dynamics are not necessarily semi-martingales or Markov processes.
Wienersche spiralen und einige andere interessante kurven in hilbertscen raum, cr (doklady)
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