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We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions.
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Informal authority in organizations
Baker, George, Gibbons, Robert, and Murphy, Kevin J · 1999
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Tirole, Jean · 1999
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Bernstein, Lisa · 2015
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Scaffolding: Using formal contracts to support informal relations in support of innovation
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Cooperative inverse reinforcement learning
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Active preference-based learning of reward functions
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Robot planning with mathematical models of human state and action, 2017
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