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The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally optimized solution.) With the advent of autonomous vehicles, capable of receiving and executing centrally assigned routes, it is natural to ask whether their deployment can eliminate this inefficiency.
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