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We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions.
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Algorithmic Persuasion with No Externalities
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Li, C., Wang, T., Wu, C., Zhao, Q., Yang, J., and Zhang, C · 2021
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Sequential persuasion
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Never explore repeatedly in multi-agent reinforcement learning
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The sample complexity of online contract design
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Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders, June 2024
Du, Z., Tang, W., Wang, Z., and Zhang, S · 2024
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Generalized principal-agency: Contracts, information, games and beyond, 2024
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Zhang, E., Zhao, S., Wang, T., Hossain, S., Gasztowtt, H., Zheng, S., Parkes, D. C., Tambe, M., and Chen, Y · 2024
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