Fetching the paper…

Reading the bibliography…

2023

Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators

Mamageishvili, Akaki, Felten, Edward W.

Original
PDF
Post on X

Understand

We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results.

We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument.
We then proceed to calculate the security of the system in the mixed Nash equilibrium, as a function of the number of validators and their stake sizes.
Our results provide lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of validators.

Incentive Schemes for Rollup Validators · Around

Built on

Towards a game theoretic view of secure computation
Gilad Asharov, Ran Canetti, and Carmit Hazay · 2011
Earlier work this paper cites.
Demystifying incentives in the consensus computer
Loi Luu, Jason Teutsch, Raghav Kulkarni, and Prateek Saxena · 2015
Earlier work this paper cites.
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts
Harry A. Kalodner, Steven Goldfeder, Xiaoqi Chen, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Edward W. Felten · 2018
Earlier work this paper cites.

Similar

Reward sharing schemes for stake pools
Lars Brünjes, Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, and Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka · 2020
Cited alongside, same era.
Staking pools on blockchains
Original
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, and Manvir Schneider · 2022
Cited alongside, same era.
Decentralized attack search and the design of bug bounty schemes
Original
Hans Gersbach, Akaki Mamageishvili, and Fikri Pitsuwan · 2023
Cited alongside, same era.

Then

On the security of optimistic blockchain mechanisms
Jiasun Li · 2023
Closest in time.
Cryptoeconomic security for data availability committees
Ertem Nusret Tas and Dan Boneh · 2023
Closest in time.

Beyond the bibliography

alphaXiv searches the wider corpus for related work and actual follow-ups.

Open on alphaXiv

alphaXiv is searching for related work…