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No-regret learners seek to minimize the difference between the loss they cumulated through the actions they played, and the loss they would have cumulated in hindsight had they consistently modified their behavior according to some strategy transformation function.
A Simplified Two-Person Poker
H. W. Kuhn · 1950
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Reduction of a Game with Complete Memory to a Matrix Game
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