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Automated auction design aims to find empirically high-revenue mechanisms through machine learning.
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
William Vickrey · 1961
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The characterization of implementable choice rules
Kevin Roberts · 1979
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Optimal auction design
Roger B Myerson · 1981
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Complexity of mechanism design
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm · 2002
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Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’Alem, and Noam Nisan · 2003
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Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm · 2004
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Methods for boosting revenue in combinatorial auctions
Anton Likhodedov and Tuomas Sandholm · 2004
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Approximating revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm, et al · 2005
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Mixed bundling auctions
Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Benny Moldovanu · 2007
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Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning
Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D Hartline, and Yishay Mansour · 2008
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A kernel-based iterative combinatorial auction
Sébastien Lahaie · 2011
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Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices
Pingzhong Tang and Tuomas Sandholm · 2012
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Distributed representations of words and phrases and their compositionality
Tomas Mikolov, Ilya Sutskever, Kai Chen, Greg S Corrado, and Jeff Dean · 2013
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Repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyers
Kareem Amin, Afshin Rostamizadeh, and Umar Syed · 2014
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The sample complexity of revenue maximization
Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden · 2014
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Understanding machine learning: From theory to algorithms
Shai Shalev-Shwartz and Shai Ben-David · 2014
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Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos · 2015
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Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers, 2015
Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K Lai, Benjamin Lubin, and David C Parkes · 2015
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Sample complexity of automated mechanism design
Maria-Florina F Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, and Ellen Vitercik · 2016
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Optimal non-parametric learning in repeated contextual auctions with strategic buyer
Alexey Drutsa · 2020
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Bisection-based pricing for repeated contextual auctions against strategic buyer
Anton Zhiyanov and Alexey Drutsa · 2020
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Learning within an instance for designing high-revenue combinatorial auctions
M-F Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, and Tuomas Sandholm · 2021
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Dynamic incentive-aware learning: Robust pricing in contextual auctions
Negin Golrezaei, Adel Javanmard, and Vahab Mirrokni · 2021
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The sample complexity of up-to- ε \varepsilon multi-dimensional revenue maximization
Yannai A Gonczarowski and S Matthew Weinberg · 2021
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Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising
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The sample complexity of auctions with side information
Nikhil R Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, and Christos-Alexandros Psomas · 2016
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Optimizing affine maximizer auctions via linear programming: an application to revenue maximizing mechanism design for zero-day exploits markets
Mingyu Guo, Hideaki Hata, and Ali Babar · 2017
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Attention is all you need
Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion Jones, Aidan N Gomez, Łukasz Kaiser, and Illia Polosukhin · 2017
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Contextual pricing for lipschitz buyers
Jieming Mao, Renato Leme, and Jon Schneider · 2018
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Optimal auctions through deep learning
Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David Parkes, and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath · 2019
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Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, and Xinzhi Zhang · 2019
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Xiangyu Liu, Chuan Yu, Zhilin Zhang, Zhenzhe Zheng, Yu Rong, Hongtao Lv, Da Huo, Yiqing Wang, Dagui Chen, Jian Xu, et al · 2021
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Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning
Neehar Peri, Michael Curry, Samuel Dooley, and John Dickerson · 2021
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Optimizing multiple performance metrics with deep GSP auctions for e-commerce advertising
Zhilin Zhang, Xiangyu Liu, Zhenzhe Zheng, Chenrui Zhang, Miao Xu, Junwei Pan, Chuan Yu, Fan Wu, Jian Xu, and Kun Gai · 2021
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A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design
Zhijian Duan, Jingwu Tang, Yutong Yin, Zhe Feng, Xiang Yan, Manzil Zaheer, and Xiaotie Deng · 2022
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Optimal-er auctions through attention
Dmitry Ivanov, Iskander Safiulin, Igor Filippov, and Ksenia Balabaeva · 2022
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Benefits of permutation-equivariance in auction mechanisms
Tian Qin, Fengxiang He, Dingfeng Shi, Wenbing Huang, and Dacheng Tao · 2022
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Differentiable economics for randomized affine maximizer auctions
Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, and John Dickerson · 2023
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Are equivariant equilibrium approximators beneficial?
Zhijian Duan, Yunxuan Ma, and Xiaotie Deng · 2023
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