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We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort.
Moral hazard and observability
Holmström, B. (1979) · 1979
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Optimal auction design
Myerson, R. B. (1981) · 1981
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Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
Myerson, R. B. (1982) · 1982
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An analysis of the principal-agent problem
Grossman, S. J. and Hart, O. D. (1983) · 1983
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Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives
Holmström, B. and Milgrom, P. (1987) · 1987
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The simple economics of optimal auctions
Bulow, J. and Roberts, J. (1989) · 1989
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Innes, R. D. (1990) · 1990
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Dütting, P., Feldman, M., Peretz, D., and Samuelson, L. (2024) · 1992
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Managerial incentives: On the near linearity of optimal compensation
Diamond, P. (1998) · 1998
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Envelope theorems for arbitrary choice sets
Milgrom, P. and Segal, I. (2002) · 2002
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Akbarpour, M., Kominers, S. D., Li, K. M., Li, S., and Milgrom, P. (2023) · 2003
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Smoothed analysis of algorithms: Why the simplex algorithm usually takes polynomial time
Spielman, D. A. and Teng, S.-H. (2004) · 2004
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Combinatorial agency
Babaioff, M., Feldman, M., Nisan, N., and Winter, E. (2012) · 2012
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Approximation in mechanism design
Hartline, J. D. (2012) · 2012
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Robustness and linear contracts
Carroll, G. (2015) · 2015
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Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations
Hart, S. and Reny, P. (2015) · 2015
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Non-optimal mechanism design
Hartline, J. D. and Lucier, B. (2015) · 2015
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Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
Balamceda, F., Balseiro, S., Correa, J., and Stier-Moses, N. E. (2016) · 2016
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The sample complexity of auctions with side information
Devanur, N. R., Huang, Z., and Psomas, C.-A. (2016) · 2016
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The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
Babaioff, M., Gonczarowski, Y. A., and Nisan, N. (2017) · 2017
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Designing menus of contracts efficiently: The power of randomization
Castiglioni, M., Marchesi, A., and Gatti, N. (2022) · 2022
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Robust incentives for teams
Dai, T. and Toikka, J. (2022) · 2022
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Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard
Gottlieb, D. and Moreira, H. (2022) · 2022
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Selling data to an agent with endogenous information
Li, Y. (2022) · 2022
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A general framework for robust contracting models
Walton, D. and Carroll, G. (2022) · 2022
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Yang, K. H. (2022) · 2022
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