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RegretNet is a recent breakthrough in the automated design of revenue-maximizing auctions.
A neural architecture for designing truthful and efficient auctions
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On the pseudo-dimension of nearly optimal auctions
J. H. Morgenstern and T. Roughgarden · 2015
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Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
T. Sandholm and A. Likhodedov · 2015
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J. L. Ba, J. R. Kiros, and G. E. Hinton · 2016
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Sample complexity of automated mechanism design
M.-F. F. Balcan, T. Sandholm, and E. Vitercik · 2016
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Learning algorithms for second-price auctions with reserve
M. Mohri and A. M. Medina · 2016
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Learning simple auctions
J. Morgenstern and T. Roughgarden · 2016
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A general statistical framework for designing strategy-proof assignment mechanisms
H. Narasimhan and D. C. Parkes · 2016
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Automated mechanism design without money via machine learning
H. Narasimhan, S. B. Agarwal, and D. C. Parkes · 2016
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Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist
C. Daskalakis, A. Deckelbaum, and C. Tzamos · 2017
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Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
Y. Jin, P. Lu, Q. Qi, Z. G. Tang, and T. Xiao · 2019
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Approximation schemes for a unit-demand buyer with independent items via symmetries
P. Kothari, S. Singla, D. Mohan, A. Schvartzman, and S. M. Weinberg · 2019
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Learning to bid in revenue-maximizing auctions
T. Nedelec, N. El Karoui, and V. Perchet · 2019
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Automated mechanism design via neural networks
W. Shen, P. Tang, and S. Zuo · 2019
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Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
Y. Jin, P. Lu, Z. G. Tang, and T. Xiao · 2020
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Transformers are rnns: Fast autoregressive transformers with linear attention
A. Katharopoulos, A. Vyas, N. Pappas, and F. Fleuret · 2020
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Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
Y. A. Gonczarowski and N. Nisan · 2017
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A sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions
V. Syrgkanis · 2017
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Reinforcement mechanism design
P. Tang · 2017
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Attention is all you need
A. Vaswani, N. Shazeer, N. Parmar, J. Uszkoreit, L. Jones, A. N. Gomez, Ł. Kaiser, and I. Polosukhin · 2017
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Deep sets
M. Zaheer, S. Kottur, S. Ravanbakhsh, B. Poczos, R. R. Salakhutdinov, and A. J. Smola · 2017
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Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets
Z. Feng, H. Narasimhan, and D. C. Parkes · 2018
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Reformer: The efficient transformer
N. Kitaev, Ł. Kaiser, and A. Levskaya · 2020
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Proportionnet: Balancing fairness and revenue for auction design with deep learning
K. Kuo, A. Ostuni, E. Horishny, M. J. Curry, S. Dooley, P.-y. Chiang, T. Goldstein, and J. P. Dickerson · 2020
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A bandit learning algorithm and applications to auction design
K. T. Nguyen · 2020
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Linformer: Self-attention with linear complexity
S. Wang, B. Z. Li, M. Khabsa, H. Fang, and H. Ma · 2020
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Deep learning—powered iterative combinatorial auctions
J. Weissteiner and S. Seuken · 2020
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The sample complexity of up-to- ε \varepsilon multi-dimensional revenue maximization
Y. A. Gonczarowski and S. M. Weinberg · 2021
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Neural auction: End-to-end learning of auction mechanisms for e-commerce advertising
X. Liu, C. Yu, Z. Zhang, Z. Zheng, Y. Rong, H. Lv, D. Huo, Y. Wang, D. Chen, J. Xu, et al · 2021
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Adversarial learning for revenue-maximizing auctions
T. Nedelec, J. Baudet, V. Perchet, and N. El Karoui · 2021
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Preferencenet: Encoding human preferences in auction design with deep learning
N. Peri, M. Curry, S. Dooley, and J. Dickerson · 2021
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Deep learning for two-sided matching
S. S. Ravindranath, Z. Feng, S. Li, J. Ma, S. D. Kominers, and D. C. Parkes · 2021
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Efficient attention: Attention with linear complexities
Z. Shen, M. Zhang, H. Zhao, S. Yi, and H. Li · 2021
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Tokens-to-token vit: Training vision transformers from scratch on imagenet
L. Yuan, Y. Chen, T. Wang, W. Yu, Y. Shi, Z.-H. Jiang, F. E. Tay, J. Feng, and S. Yan · 2021
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A reinforcement learning approach in multi-phase second-price auction design
R. Ai, B. Lyu, Z. Wang, Z. Yang, and M. I. Jordan · 2022
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Differentiable economics for randomized affine maximizer auctions
M. J. Curry, T. Sandholm, and J. P. Dickerson · 2022
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A context-integrated transformer-based neural network for auction design
Z. Duan, J. Tang, Y. Yin, Z. Feng, X. Yan, M. Zaheer, and X. Deng · 2022
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Benefits of permutation-equivariance in auction mechanisms
T. Qin, F. He, D. Shi, W. Huang, and D. Tao · 2022
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