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Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost.
The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem
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David S. Johnson and Franco P Preparata · 1978
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Sanford J Grossman and Oliver D Hart · 1983
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Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom · 1987
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Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom · 1991
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The computational complexity of densest region detection
Shai Ben-David, Nadav Eiron, and Hans Ulrich Simon · 2002
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Incentive compatible regression learning
Ofer Dekel, Felix Fischer, and Ariel D. Procaccia · 2010
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Convergence of Stochastic Processes
D. Pollard · 2011
Cited alongside, same era.
Algorithms for strategyproof classification
Reshef Meir, Ariel D Procaccia, and Jeffrey S Rosenschein · 2012
Cited alongside, same era.
Algorithms and hardness for robust subspace recovery
Moritz Hardt and Ankur Moitra · 2013
Cited alongside, same era.
Learning optimal commitment to overcome insecurity
Avrim Blum, Nika Haghtalab, and Ariel D. Procaccia · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
Optimum statistical estimation with strategic data sources
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and Christos Papadimitriou · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Robustness and linear contracts
Gabriel Carroll · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Strategyproof linear regression in high dimensions
Yiling Chen, Chara Podimata, Ariel D Procaccia, and Nisarg Shah · 2018
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Strategic classification from revealed preferences
Jinshuo Dong, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Bo Waggoner, and Zhiwei Steven Wu · 2018
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Simple versus optimal contracts
Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, and Inbal Talgam-Cohen · 2019
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The disparate effects of strategic manipulation
Lily Hu, Nicole Immorlica, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan · 2019
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How do classifiers induce agents to invest effort strategically?
Jon Kleinberg and Manish Raghavan · 2019
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The social cost of strategic classification
Smitha Milli, John Miller, Anca D Dragan, and Moritz Hardt · 2019
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Nika Haghtalab, Fei Fang, Thanh Hong Nguyen, Arunesh Sinha, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Milind Tambe · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Strategic classification
Moritz Hardt, Nimrod Megiddo, Christos Papadimitriou, and Mary Wootters · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
Multiagent evaluation mechanisms
Tal Alon, Magdalen Dobson, Ariel D Procaccia, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and Jamie Tucker-Foltz · 2020
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Strategic classification is causal modeling in disguise
John Miller, Smitha Milli, and Moritz Hardt · 2020
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