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Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design.
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
William Vickrey · 1961
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Optimal auction design
Roger B Myerson · 1981
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Complexity of mechanism design
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm · 2002
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Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm · 2004
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Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
Alejandro Manelli and Daniel Vincent · 2006
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Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Jason D. Hartline and Tim Roughgarden · 2009
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Computationally feasible automated mechanism design: General approach and case studies
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Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
Alejandro M Manelli and Daniel R Vincent · 2010
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Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
Saeed Alaei · 2011
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A kernel-based iterative combinatorial auction
Sébastien Lahaie · 2011
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Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
Gregory Pavlov · 2011
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Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction
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An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2012
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Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2012
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Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
Constantinos Daskalakis and Seth Matthew Weinberg · 2012
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Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan · 2012
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The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, and Jason Hartline · 2013
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The menu-size complexity of auctions
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan · 2013
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On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
Xinye Li and Andrew Chi-Chih Yao · 2013
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A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2014
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The sample complexity of revenue maximization
Richard Cole and Tim Roughgarden · 2014
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The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos · 2014
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Revenue maximization with a single sample
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, and Qiqi Yan · 2014
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Sampling and representation complexity of revenue maximization
Shaddin Dughmi, Li Han, and Noam Nisan · 2014
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Adam: A method for stochastic optimization
Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba · 2014
Ironing in the dark
Tim Roughgarden and Okke Schrijvers · 2016
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Strong duality for a multiple-good monopolist
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos · 2017
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Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan · 2017
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A sample complexity measure with applications to learning optimal auctions
Vasilis Syrgkanis · 2017
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Deep sets
Manzil Zaheer, Satwik Kottur, Siamak Ravanbakhsh, Barnabas Poczos, Russ R Salakhutdinov, and Alexander J Smola · 2017
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Deep learning for revenue-optimal auctions with budgets
Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, and David C Parkes · 2018
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Learning theory and algorithms for revenue optimization in second price auctions with reserve
Andres M Medina and Mehryar Mohri · 2014
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Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
Zihe Wang and Pingzhong Tang · 2014
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Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
Saeed Alaei, Jason D. Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, and Yang Yuan · 2015
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Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers
Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K Lai, Benjamin Lubin, and David C Parkes · 2015
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Maximizing Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations
Sergiu Hart and Philip J. Reny · 2015
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On the pseudo-dimension of nearly optimal auctions
Jamie H Morgenstern and Tim Roughgarden · 2015
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Deep learning for multi-facility location mechanism design
Noah Golowich, Harikrishna Narasimhan, and David C. Parkes · 2018
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The sample complexity of up-to- ε \varepsilon multidimensional revenue maximization
Yannai A. Gonczarowski and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2018
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Deep models of interactions across sets
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Making the most of your samples
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Invariant and equivariant graph networks
Haggai Maron, Heli Ben-Hamu, Nadav Shamir, and Yaron Lipman · 2018
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Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items
Hedyeh Beyhaghi and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2019
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Optimal auctions through deep learning
Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David Parkes, and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath · 2019
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Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, and Xinzhi Zhang · 2019
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Sample complexity for non-truthful mechanisms
Jason D. Hartline and Samuel Taggart · 2019
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Tight approximation ratio of anonymous pricing
Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi, Zhihao Gavin Tang, and Tao Xiao · 2019
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Automated mechanism design via neural networks
Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, and Song Zuo · 2019
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A neural architecture for designing truthful and efficient auctions
Andrea Tacchetti, DJ Strouse, Marta Garnelo, Thore Graepel, and Yoram Bachrach · 2019
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