Fetching the paper…
Reading the bibliography…
Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002].
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
William Vickrey · 1961
Earlier work this paper cites.
Optimal auction design
Roger B Myerson · 1981
Earlier work this paper cites.
Multiproduct nonlinear pricing
Mark Armstrong · 1996
Earlier work this paper cites.
Complexity of mechanism design
Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm · 2002
Earlier work this paper cites.
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
Alejandro M Manelli and Daniel R Vincent · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
Algorithmic game theory , volume 1
Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V Vazirani · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
Jason D Hartline and Tim Roughgarden · 2009
Earlier work this paper cites.
Mechanism design: a linear programming approach , volume 47
Rakesh V Vohra · 2011
Earlier work this paper cites.
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi-to single-agent reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, and Azarakhsh Malekian · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2012
Earlier work this paper cites.
Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, and S. Matthew Weinberg · 2012
Cited alongside, same era.
Mechanism design via optimal transport
Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, and Christos Tzamos · 2013
Cited alongside, same era.
The menu-size complexity of auctions
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan · 2013
Cited alongside, same era.
On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items
Xinye Li and Andrew Chi-Chih Yao · 2013
Cited alongside, same era.
Generative adversarial nets
Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
Multi-dimensional virtual values and second-degree price discrimination
Optimal auctions for negatively correlated items
Pingzhong Tang and Zihe Wang · 2016
Later among the works it cites.
Optimal mechanism for selling two items to a single buyer having uniformly distributed valuations
D Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, and Y Narahari · 2016
Later among the works it cites.
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao · 2016
Later among the works it cites.
Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening
Gabriel Carroll · 2017
Later among the works it cites.
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan · 2017
Later among the works it cites.
Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
Pingzhong Tang and Zihe Wang · 2017
alphaXiv searches the wider corpus for related work and actual follow-ups.
alphaXiv is searching for related work…
Nima Haghpanah and Jason Hartline · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
An n-to-1 bidder reduction for multi-item auctions and its applications
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
Multi-item auctions defying intuition?
Constantinos Daskalakis · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
Tuomas Sandholm and Anton Likhodedov · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Optimal mechanism for selling two goods
Gregory Pavlov
Cited in the paper.
A property of solutions to linear monopoly problems
Gregory Pavlov
Cited in the paper.
Later among the works it cites.
On optimal mechanisms in the two-item single-buyer unit-demand setting
D Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, and Y Narahari · 2017
Later among the works it cites.
Optimal auctions through deep learning
Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David Parkes, and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath · 2019
Closest in time.
Optimal auctions through deep learning, 2020
Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David Parkes, and Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath · 2020
Closest in time.