Inference on Auctions with Weak Assumptions on Information

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Robust predictions in games with incomplete information

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Robust data-driven efficiency guarantees in auctions

Original

D. Hoy, D. Nekipelov, and V. Syrgkanis · 2015

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Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games

D. Bergemann and S. Morris · 2016

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Bayesian inference in a class of partially identified models

B. Kline and E. Tamer · 2016

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Estimation of discrete games with weak assumptions on information

L. Magnolfi and C. Roncoroni · 2016

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First-price auctions with general information structures: Implications for bidding and revenue

D. Bergemann, B. Brooks, and S. Morris · 2017

Closest in time.

Composable and efficient mechanisms

V. Syrgkanis and E. Tardos · 2029