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The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees.
Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
Moni Naor, Benny Pinkas, and Reuban Sumner · 1999
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M+1-st price auction using homomorphic encryption
Masayuki Abe and Koutarou Suzuki · 2002
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Impact of the information provided to consumers on their willingness to pay for champagne: comparison with hedonic scores
Christine Lange, Christophe Martin, Claire Chabanet, Pierre Combris, and Sylvie Issanchou · 2002
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Secure vickrey auctions without threshold trust
Helger Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and Valtteri Niemi · 2002
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Revealing consumers’ willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the bdm mechanism and the vickrey auction
Charles Noussair, Stephane Robin, and Bernard Ruffieux · 2004
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A practical implementation of secure auctions based on multiparty integer computation
Peter Bogetoft, Ivan Damgård, Thomas P. Jakobsen, Kurt Nielsen, Jakob Pagter, and Tomas Toft · 2006
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Competitive auctions
Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Michael E. Saks, and Andrew Wright · 2006
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Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system, 2008
Satoshi Nakamoto · 2008
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Willingness-to-pay in non-profit sports clubs
Pamela Wicker · 2011
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On Bitcoin and red balloons
Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, and Aviv Zohar · 2012
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Information propagation in the bitcoin network
Christian Decker and Roger Wattenhofer · 2013
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The economics of bitcoin mining, or bitcoin in the presence of adversaries
Joshua A Kroll, Ian C Davey, and Edward W Felten · 2013
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The economics of bitcoin transaction fees, 2014
Nicolas Houy · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
Bitcoin: Economics, technology, and governance
Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, and Tyler Moore · 2015
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A transaction fee market exists without a block size limit
Peter R. Rizun · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Secure high-rate transaction processing in bitcoin
Yonatan Sompolinsky and Aviv Zohar · 2015
Cited alongside, same era.
Why buy when you can rent? - bribery attacks on bitcoin-style consensus
Joseph Bonneau · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
On the instability of Bitcoin without the block reward
Miles Carlsten, Harry A. Kalodner, S. Matthew Weinberg, and Arvind Narayanan · 2016
Cited alongside, same era.
The gap game
Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal · 2018
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An incentive analysis of some bitcoin fee designs, 2018
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao · 2018
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Sok: Tools for game theoretic models of security for cryptocurrencies, 2019
Sarah Azouvi and Alexander Hicks · 2019
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Towards a functional fee market for cryptocurrencies, 2019
Soumya Basu, David Easley, Maureen O’Hara, and Emin Gün Sirer · 2019
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EIP-1559: Fee market change for ETH 1.0 chain, 2019
Vitalik Buterin, Eric Conner, Rick Dudley, Matthew Slipper, Ian Norden, and Abdelhamid Bakhta · 2019
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An axiomatic approach to block rewards
Xi Chen, Christos H. Papadimitriou, and Tim Roughgarden · 2019
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Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies - A Comprehensive Introduction
Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward W. Felten, Andrew Miller, and Steven Goldfeder · 2016
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Rebatable fees & incentive-safe fee markets
Mark Friedenbach · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Monopoly without a monopolist: An economic analysis of the bitcoin payment system
Gur Huberman, Jacob D Leshno, and Ciamac C Moallemi · 2017
Cited alongside, same era.
Strategy-proofness in the Large
Eduardo M Azevedo and Eric Budish · 2018
Cited alongside, same era.
Forward blocks: On-chain/settlement capacity increases without the hard-fork
Mark Friedenbach · 2018
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Ron Lavi, Or Sattath, and Aviv Zohar · 2019
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Bitcoin: An impossibility theorem for proof-of-work based protocols
Jacob Leshno and Philipp Strack · 2019
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A survey on applications of game theory in blockchain, 2019
Ziyao Liu, Nguyen Cong Luong, Wenbo Wang, Dusit Niyato, Ping Wang, Ying-Chang Liang, and Dong In Kim · 2019
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Transaction fee mechanism design for the Ethereum blockchain: An economic analysis of EIP-1559, 2020
Tim Roughgarden · 2020
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Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market, 2021
Matheus VX Ferreira, Daniel J Moroz, David C Parkes, and Mitchell Stern · 2021
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