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The generalized second price (GSP) auction has served as the core selling mechanism for sponsored search ads for over a decade.
Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches
Yuzo Fujishima, Kevin Leyton-Brown, and Yoav Shoham · 1999
Earlier work this paper cites.
A branch-and-price algorithm and new test problems for spectrum auctions
Oktay Günlük, Lászlo Ladányi, and Sven De Vries · 2005
Earlier work this paper cites.
Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
Benjamin Edelman and Michael Ostrovsky · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords
Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
Position auctions
Hal R. Varian · 2007
Earlier work this paper cites.
ICE: An expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, and David C. Parkes · 2008
Earlier work this paper cites.
Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets
Xiaotie Deng, Yang Sun, Ming Yin, and Yunhong Zhou · 2010
Cited alongside, same era.
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Paul Milgrom · 2010
Cited alongside, same era.
A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions
Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, and Christopher A. Wilkens · 2013
Cited alongside, same era.
Optimising trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions
Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, and David Kurokawa · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
Web and Internet Economics: 10th International Conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014. Proceedings
Ruggiero Cavallo and Christopher A. Wilkens · 2014
Cited alongside, same era.
The vcg auction in theory and practice
Hal R. Varian and Christopher Harris · 2014
Later among the works it cites.
Mechanism design for mixed ads
Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, and Mohammad Reza Khani · 2015
Later among the works it cites.
On the truthfulness of gsp
Ruggiero Cavallo, Prabhakar Krishnamurthy, and Christopher A. Wilkens · 2015
Later among the works it cites.
Truthful outcomes from non-truthful position auctions
Paul Dütting, Felix Fischer, and David C. Parkes · 2016
Later among the works it cites.
Mechanism design for value maximizers
Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, and Rad Niazadeh · 2016
Later among the works it cites.
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