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2015

APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items

Lee, Euiwoong

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We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities to maximize the Nash social welfare.

Cole and Gkatzelis recently proved that this problem admits a constant factor approximation.
We complement their result by showing that this problem is APX-hard.

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