Fetching the paper…
Reading the bibliography…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known distribution.
Optimal auction design
R. Myerson · 1981
Earlier work this paper cites.
Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables
Ester Samuel-Cahn · 1984
Earlier work this paper cites.
Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
R.P. McAfee and J. McMillan · 1988
Earlier work this paper cites.
The simple economics of optimal auctions
J. Bulow and J. Roberts · 1989
Earlier work this paper cites.
Nonlinear Pricing
Robert B. Wilson · 1997
Earlier work this paper cites.
Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
Jean-Charles Rochet and Philippe Chone · 1998
Earlier work this paper cites.
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
D. Lehmann, L. I. O’Callaghan, and Y. Shoham · 1999
Earlier work this paper cites.
Algorithmic mechanism design
N. Nisan and A. Ronen · 1999
Earlier work this paper cites.
The value of knowing a demand curve: Bounds on regret for on-line posted-price auctions
R. Kleinberg and T. Leighton · 2003
Earlier work this paper cites.
Online learning in online auctions
A. Blum, V. Kumar, A. Rudra, and F. Wu · 2004
Cited alongside, same era.
Near-optimal online auctions
A. Blum and J. Hartline · 2005
Cited alongside, same era.
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
A. Goldberg and J. Hartline · 2005
Cited alongside, same era.
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing
V. Guruswami, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, D. Kempe, C. Kenyon, and F. McSherry · 2005
Cited alongside, same era.
The lovely but lonely vickrey auction
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom · 2006
Cited alongside, same era.
Towards hardness of envy-free pricing
P. Briest · 2006
Cited alongside, same era.
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations
S. Chawla, J. Hartline, and R. Kleinberg · 2007
Later among the works it cites.
Multidimensional mechanism design: Revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
D. Vincent and A. Manelli · 2007
Later among the works it cites.
Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic analysis
L. Blumrosen and T. Holenstein · 2008
Later among the works it cites.
Auctions on eBay: A Dying Breed
Catherine Holahan · 2008
Later among the works it cites.
Secretary problems: weights and discounts
Moshe Babaioff, Michael Dinitz, Anupam Gupta, Nicole Immorlica, and Kunal Talwar · 2009
Closest in time.
Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
Moshe Babaioff, Ron Lavi, and Elan Pavlov · 2009
Closest in time.
alphaXiv searches the wider corpus for related work and actual follow-ups.
alphaXiv is searching for related work…
Tuomas Sandholm and Andrew Gilpin · 2006
Cited alongside, same era.
Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, and R. Kleinberg · 2007
Cited alongside, same era.
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
J. Hartline and T. Roughgarden · 2009
Closest in time.
Algorithms for secretary problems on graphs and hypergraphs
Nitish Korula and Martin Pál · 2009
Closest in time.